Introduction
This paper first introduces the (classical style) model theory of a first-order logic called N 4 . The salient characteristic of N 4 is that it does not eliminate double negations as classical logic does (in N 4 , ¬¬F is not logically equivalent to F and ¬¬¬F is not logically equivalent to ¬F ), but instead it reduces fourfold negations (in N 4 , ¬¬¬¬F is logically equivalent to ¬¬F ). The name N 4 stresses that fourfold negations are reduced.
Despite its nonstandard treatment of negation, N 4 is very close to classical logic. Like classical logic, N 4 has two truth values, its implication is material (in N 4 , A → B is logically equivalent to ¬A ∨ B), and the truth value of a formula is defined recursively in terms of the truth values of its subformulas. Most logical consequences of classical logic hold also in N 4 . In particular, negation distributes over compound formulas in N 4 as it does in classical logic. Also, in N 4 F logically implies ¬¬F (but the converse does not hold) and three laws of excluded middle hold (F ∨ ¬F , ¬F ∨ ¬¬F , and ¬¬F ∨ ¬¬¬F are always true but F ∨ ¬¬¬F might be false in some so-called incomplete N 4 interpretations). Furthermore, a classical logic model of a set S of formulas is also a N 4 model of S. This paper investigates formalizing the semantics of normal logic programs using N 4 . A few results suggest that N 4 is convenient for this purpose. Classical logic Herbrand interpretations generalize straightforwardly to N 4 as interpretations characterized by the ground atoms and the doubly negated ground atoms (instead of only the ground atoms) they satisfy. The classical minimal Herbrand model of a positive logic program coincides with its (unique) minimal N 4 Herbrand model. Every normal logic program has (in general many) minimal N 2 Syntax, Terminology, and Notations N 4 syntax is that of classical first-order logic. If L is a first-order language, its (non-empty) set of constants will be noted Const L , the set of its n-ary (n ≥ 1) function symbols will be noted Fun n L , and the set of its n-ary (n ≥ 0) predicate symbols will be noted Rel n L . A first-order language is assumed to include the falsum ⊥, the unary connective ¬, the binary connectives ∧ ∨, and the quantifiers ∀ ∃.
In the following, a fixed first-order language L is assumed. The terms, ground terms, Herbrand universe, atoms or atomic formulas, formulas, closed formulas, etc. of L are defined as usual. Note that the falsum ⊥ is not an atom. n-fold (n ≥ 0) negations will be noted ¬ n . A formula F is in prefix negation form if F = ¬ n G (n ≥ 0) and no negations occur in G. Two additional connectives, → and ↔, and the verum ⊤ are defined as follows as shorthand notations:
The following unusual notion of literal will be used. A positive program clause (general program clause, resp.) in L is an expression of the form A ← B 1 , . . . , B n (n ≥ 0), where A is an atom of L and B 1 , . . . , and B n are atoms (atoms or negated atoms, resp.) of L. A positive (normal or general, resp.) logic program in L is a finite set of positive (general, resp.) program clauses in L.
N
4 Model Theory N 4 interpretations resemble that of classical logic. A significant difference is that they assign relations not only to predicate symbols, as classical logic interpretations do, but also to doubly negated predicate symbols. 
Thus, in a N 4 interpretation only one of the three truth assignments of Figure 1 
4 interpretation of L and V a variable assignment with respect to I. The term assignment val I,V with respect to I and V is defined as follows: 
On can prove as follows that val I,V is a total function over the formulas of L. For each formula F exactly one of the clauses 1.1 to 4 of Definition 5 apply. (Which clause applies to a formula depends on its structure.) Therefore, val I,V (.) = true defines a partial function. Because of clause 5, val I,V is total. Since val I,V is a total function, Definition 5 correctly specifies the valuation of formulas in an N 4 interpretation.
Definition 5 differs from its classical logic counterpart as follows. To obtain the definition of classical logic, drop clauses 2.1 through 3.5 and replace clause 4 by:
Note that, although clauses 2.1 through 3.5 are not needed in the classical logic counterpart of Definition 5, they hold in classical logic. Note also that the elimination of double negation follows from clause 4'.
Properties of N 4 are given in the rest of this section. From now on, I = (D I , val I ) denotes a N 4 interpretation of L, V a variable assignment with respect to I, and F , F 1 , F 2 , F 3 , G, G 1 , and G 2 formulas of L. Proposition 1.
val I,V (⊥) = false and val
As Figures 2 and 3 show, Proposition 2 does not generalize to all formulas. Proposition 3.
Fourfold negation reduction: val
false true true false 
3 F might be false in some N 4 interpretations. This is for example the case of F = p in the N 4 interpretation of Figure 3 .
In N 4 , implications are defined in terms of negation and disjunction. In contrast to classical logic, in N 4 not all disjunctions are expressible in terms of implications. For some formulas F 1 and F 2 , N 4 interpretations I, and variable assignments V, val I,V ((¬F 1 → F 2 )) = true and val I,V ((F 1 ∨ F 2 )) = false. This is the case, e.g. if F 1 and F 2 are propositional variables and if I evaluates F 1 and F 2 as shown on Figure 4 .
false true false true false true false false Figure 5 gives the possible valuations of p, ¬p, ¬ 2 p and ¬ 3 p in N 4 interpretations in which F 1 and F 2 are true. In classical logic, only the first of these valuations is possible.
true false true false false true true false Figure 6 gives the two possible valuations of a, ¬ 2 a, b, and ¬ 2 b in N 4 interpretations in which S 2 is true. Figure 7 gives the possible valuations of p, ¬p, and ¬ 2 p in N 4 interpretations in which S 3 is true.
true false true false true true 
Thus, if B L denotes the classical Herbrand base of a first-order language L,
is the N 4 Herbrand interpretation generated by M .
The uniqueness of H 2 (M ) asserted in Definition 10 follows immediately from Definition 8.
The order on classical interpretations extends to N 4 interpretations.
Definition 12 (Intersection of N 4 Interpretations). Let {I k | k ∈ C} be a collection of N 4 interpretations of L such that 1.
The following characterization of minimal N 4 Herbrand models is used in the next section.
Proposition 7. Let S be a set of formulas of L and M a closed subset of
B 2 L . LetM = {¬L | L ∈ B 2 L \ M }. H 2 L (M ) is a minimal N 4 Herbrand model of S iff 1. H 2 L (M ) |= N 4 S. 2. For all L ∈ M , S ∪M |= N 4 L.
Minimal N 4 Herbrand Models of Normal Logic Programs
Since double negations are not eliminated in N 4 , the following interpretation of program clauses as formulas will be used. The following examples suggest that complete minimal N 4 Herbrand models might convey a logic program's intuitive meaning. The first two examples are odd, resp. even length recursion cycles through negation. Figure  8 gives the valuations of p, ¬p, and ¬ 2 p in this model (compare with Figure 5 Fig. 9 . Minimal N 4 models of P = {b ← ¬a ; a ← ¬b}
, and H 2 L ({b, ¬ 2 b}). Figure 9 gives the valuations of the N 4 literals in these models (compare with Figure 6 ).
Compare with the previous examples. Proposition 8 does not hold in classical logic. Consider for example P 1 = {p ← ¬p}. Assume that p is the only predicate symbol of L and let M = {p, ¬ 2 p}. In classical logic P 1 ∪M = P 1 |= p but Simp M (P 1 ) = ∅ |= p.
Proposition 9. Let P be a normal logic program. A N
4 Herbrand model of P is stable iff it is complete and minimal.
Perspectives and Related Work
The approach presented here seems to enjoy many of the strong and weak principles of [3, 4] . E.g. "Cut", "Cautious Monotonicity", and the "Principle of Partial Evaluation" result directly from the the classical-style evaluation function (Definition 5), "Relevance" from N 4 treatment of double negations and from model minimality (Proposition 8). This deserves deeper investigations.
The model theory of N 4 presented in this paper needs to be complemented with a proof theory. First investigations indicate that natural deduction and the tableau method well adapt to N 4 . A tableau method for N 4 would provide with a basis for defining a fixpoint-like generation of the minimal N 4 Herbrand models of a normal logic program. Also, it would be useful for program development to have at disposal a backward reasoning method able to detect whether, for some instance Gσ of a goal G, a logic program has a Gσ-incomplete minimal N 4 Herbrand model.
Publications on the semantics of normal logic programs are numerous -cf. the surveys [2, 3, 4, 5, 1, 6] . For space reasons, these publications cannot be discussed here in detail. Most of them can be roughly classified in ad hoc definitions of models (such as [8] ) for (restricted or unrestricted) normal logic programs, forward reasoning methods for computing models, approaches referring to nonstandard logics (often three-valued logics), and approaches based on program transformations. The approach presented here is of the first and third types. Its particularities are that it is based upon a notion of minimal Herbrand models and that it refers to a nonstandard logic rather close to classical logic. Note interesting similarites with the transformation-based approach of [7, 11] . Note also that N 4 can be seen as a four-valued logic (the truth values of which can be read "true", "false", "required", and "not required").
Aspects of the work presented here have been inspired from [9, 10] as follows. The interpretation of program clauses as N 4 formulas (Definition 13) is reminiscent of their processing in [9] . The characterization of minimal N 4 Herbrand models (Proposition 7) is an adaptation to N 4 of a result given in [10] for classical logic.
The proof is by induction on the structure of F . Let IH(G) denote:
F is an atom or F = ⊥. val I,V ((F ∨ ¬F )) = true by Def. 5 (1.3, 2.1) .
). By Def. 5 (3.3), Prop. 1 (1), and IH(F 1 ):
. Assume IH(F 1 ) and IH(F 2 ) (ind. hyp.).
By Def. 5 (3.3), Prop. 1, IH(F 1 ), and IH(
The proof is similar to those of the preceding case. 6. F = ∀xF 1 . Assume IH(F 1 ) (ind. hyp.). By Def. 5 (3.3), Prop. 1, and IH(F 1 ):
The proof is similar to those of the preceding case.
Proof of Proposition 4:
First note that val I,V (¬ 2 ⊤) = true since Def. 5 (4, 3.1). Assume val I,V (F ) = true. Then, by Prop. 1 (8) 
Proof of Proposition 5:
2 → 3: By definition of complete and A-complete N 4 interpretations. 3 → 2: Let I be a N 4 interpretation which is A-complete for all atoms A. The proof is by induction on the structure of F .
Basis cases:
1. F = ⊥. By Prop. 1 (1), val I,V (⊥) = false and val I,V (¬⊥) = val I,V (⊤) = true. Therefore, I is ⊥-complete. 2. F is an atom. I is F -complete, since by hypothesis, it is A-complete for all atoms A.
Induction cases:
Assume that I is F 1 -complete (ind. hyp.). By Prop. 1 (9, 10) ,
Proof of Proposition 6:
As its classical logic counterparts, the result follows directly from the definition of the intersection of interpretations (Def. 12). 
Proof of Proposition 7:
Necessary condition: Assume that H 2 (M ) is a minimal N 4 Herbrand model of S. Thus, 1 holds. If M = ∅, then 2 holds trivially. Otherwise, let L ∈ M . Let L = ¬L. If S ∪M |= N 4 L, then S ∪M ∪{L} has a N 4 Herbrand model, hence also a minimal N 4 Herbrand model, say H 2 (N ). By definition of H 2 (N ), H 2 (N ) |= N 4L. Therefore, H 2 (N ) |= N 4 L (Prop. 2), i.e. L ∈ N . Since H 2 (N ) |= N 4 S ∪M , N ⊆ M . Since L ∈ M \ N , N = M . This contradict the minimality of H 2 (M ) since H 2 (N ) |= N 4 S.
